



THE RIGHT TO ALIMONY AFTER DIVORCE.
IN view of the state of the authorities it is very difficult to assert
a general rule governing this subject, and this difficulty has been
increased instead of lessened by the courts failing to separate this*
question from jurisdictional questions of the domicile and of the
delictum, and of the effect of an ex parte decree of divorce, as well
as the failure to distinguish between the doctrine of maintenance
and that of alimony.
At the bottom of this question there are three propositions: 1st,
a marriage valid where it is solemnized or contracted, is valid
everywhere; 2d, a divorce valid where decreed, is valid every-
where; 3d, the allowance of alimony valid where made, is valid
everywhere. These propositions have not been universally ap-
proved and adopted, but they are supported by the weight of
authority, and have more common sense and principle for their
basis than any other view.
From the adjudications two propositions are deducible; one,
that alimony is only an incident of a divorce, and not a subject
matter or right grantable in an independent separate proceeding
where it is the only relief sought, unless the state statute so pro-
vides and makes it an independent right. It therefore follows that
the court which grants the divorce can only allow the alimony;
that no court, unless expressly so empowered by the statute, has
power to grant alimony alone; and that if the court which decrees
the divorce fails to allow alimony, or allows inadequate alimony, no
other court can act in the matter-for when any matter is deter-
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mined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that is the end of that
matter, and all other matters belonging to and which might have
been determined in that proceeding or litigation. The other
proposition is the reverse of this, holding that alimony is not only
an incident or concomitant of a divorce, but that it is the subject
of an original jurisdiction, per se, and can be obtained in an inde-
penlent proceeding, and that, too, before or after the divorce pro-
ceeding is ended, and for the same cause or causes for which the
divorce was granted ; that it is incident to a divorce only in the
meaning that it may follow a divorce in the divorce proceedings,
not necessarily attached to it, nor in the same proceeding or court,
but obtainable after the divorce is granted either in a domestic or a
foreign tribunal.
Referring to the first proposition, the reasoning would be that
if alimony is only an incident of or to a divorce, it cannot be the
subject-matter of original jurisdiction, because an incident of or to
a matter is not the matter itself. If this is correct, then the court
having jurisdiction of the divorce has ipso facto jurisdiction of-the
alimony, and it therefore follows that a court having jurisdiction to
decree an ex parte divorce, can also decree alimony in that ex parte
proceeding which would be an ex parte judgment for money, with-
out jurisdiction in personam or in rem, a conclusion almost gen-
erally repudiated: Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481; Webster v.
Reid, 11 How. (U. S.) 437 ; Nations v. Jdhnson, 24 Id. 195 ;
Boswell v. Otis, 9 Id. 336; AfeJlmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312;
2 Am. L. Ca. 551 ; D'Arcy v. Ketehum, 11 How. (U. S.) 165.
If the first proposition (that alimony is an incident.of divorce) is
correct, the court must have jurisdiction of the divorce or it cannot
determine the alimony; hence it follows that to know what will
constitute a valid decree for the latter, we must know what
confers jurisdiction of divorce. If the second proposition is true
this is not necessary, because proceedings for alimony alone would
be governed by the law applicable to all proceedings for money
only.
The first proposition 'is supported, I believe, by the weight of
authority, yet the conclusions legitimately flowing therefrom are
rejected, hence the question of jurisdiction in divorce is important.
It is settled that the law of the place of the actual bona fide
domicile of the parties gives jurisdiction to the proper courts to
decree a divorce for any cause allowed by the local law without
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regard to the place of the marriage or place of the delictum:
Story Confl. L., sect. 230; Rarding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 140;
Tolen v. Tolen, 2 Blackf. 407; Wall v: Williamson, 8 Ala. 48;
Harrison v. Harrison, 19 Id. 499; Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass.
227; Barber v. Root, 10 Id. 260; -ellows v. Fellows, 8 N. H.
160,; Pawling v. Bird, 13 Johns.. 192; Maguire v. Maguire, 7
Dana 181. This means the domicile of both husband and wife.
This proposition is not disputed, but there are other propositions
involved in or growing out of this which are disputed, such as
whether the domicile of one of the parties is sufficient, and whether
or not this domicile means the domicile at the time of the delietum.
Domicile is the place where a person lives, and as applicable to
marriage it is the place where both husband and wife live (Story
Confi. L., sect. 41; Phill. Dom. 11; 2 Bish. M. & D. Ch. 8);
their then permanent place of abode as to all present intents and
purposes.
The wife's domicile is in the place where the husband lives,
because the law considers husband and wife one person, and its
policy is that they cohabit together: ffarteau v. Harteau, 14
Pick. 181; Colvin v. Reed, 55 Penn. St. 375; Greene v. Greene,
11 Pick. 410; Hlairston v. Eairston, 27 Miss. 704; Smith v.
.Morehead, 6 Jones Eq. 360; Williams v. Saunders, 5 Cald. 60;
2 Bish. M. & D. ch. 9. This domicile once fixed continues until
changed. It can be changed by the joint removal of the domicile
animus non revertendi, or by either upon the commission of the
delictum against the matrimonial consortium. If the husband
commits the delictum the wife can refuse cohabitation and estab-
lish a domicile of her own, separate and independent from the
husband, because if she cohabit after the delictum, it will be
condonation. The misconduct of the husband gives her this right:
Irby v. Wilson, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 568; Stevens v. Stevens, 1
Met. 279; Davis v. Davis, 30 Il1. 180; Masten v. Masten, 15
N. I. 159; Kashaw v. Kashaw, 3 Cal. 312; Harrison v. Har-
rison, 20 Ala. 629; Williamson v. Parisien, 1 Johns. Ch. 389;
Smith v. Smith, 4 Greene (Iowa) 266; Coddington y. Coddington,
5 0. E. Greene 263; Lkyon v. Lyon, 2 Gray 367. "The wife
can acquire a separate domicile whenever it is necessary and proper
for her to do so. The right springs from the necessity of its exer-
cise, and endures as long as the necessity continues. The pro-
ceedings for a divorce may be instituted where the wife has her
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domicile. The place of the marriage, of the offence and the domicile
of the husband are of no consequence :" (Jheever v. Wilson, 9
Wall. 108; Bennett v. Bennett, Deady 299. Hence, if she has
the right to establish a new domicile, she can sue in the old
domicile or in the new. If she can sue in the new domicile she
can obtain an ex parte decree. But some cases have held
that' the wife must sue in the domicile existing at the time
of the delictum: Hopkins v. .Hopkins, 35 N. H. 474; Schonwald
v. Schonwald, 2 Jones Eq. 867; JKruse v. Kruse, 25 Mo. 68;
Ashbaugh v. Ashbaugh, 17 Ill. 476. This apparent conflict will
be reconciled. The same rule applies to the husband; hence, if
she commits the delicturn, the husband can sue in the forum of the
domicile existing at the time of the offence, or establish a new domi-
cile and sue in that new one: Warrender v. Warrender, 2 C1. &
F. 488; Chichester v. Donegal, 1 Add. Ecc. 5; Borden v.
Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; Greene v. Greene, 11 Pick. 410; Hull
v. Hull, 2 Strobh. Eq. 174; Hare v. Hare, 10 Tex. 855; Hood v.
Hood, 11 Allen 196.
Alimony is a provision for the support or maintenance of the
wife, grantable by a court and payable by the husband: Burr v.
Burr, 7 Hill 207; Wallingsford v. Wallingsford, 6 Har. & J.
485; Bogers v. Vines, 6 Ired. 293. It is 1st, temporary, and
2d, permanent. Temporary when granted: 1st, pendente lite, and
2d, as a separate support or maintenance. Permanent when
allowed as a permanent provision for support upon a divorce a
vinculo.
The jurisdiction of our courts over the matter of alimony is
derived from the English courts, or is statutory, or both.
In England, before the Cromwellian period and after the restora-
tion until 1858, the ecclesiastical courts had exclusive jurisdiction
of divorce and alimony, and did not grant alimony but in the pro-
ceedings resulting in the divorce. During the Cromwellian period
these courts did not exist. Their jurisdiction as to alimony was
exercised by the judges of the chancery court but did not extend to
divorces, for the reason that the then governmental policy and the
express language of their commission limited the jurisdiction to
causes of alimony alone: Fonb. Eq. 96, 97 ; Oxenden v. Oxenden,
2 Vern. 493; Head y. Head, 8 Atk. 295; Lasbrook v. Tyler, 1
Rep. Ch. 44; Ashton v. Ashton, Id. 164; Watkyns v. Watkyns,
2 Atk. 96; Duncan v. Duncan, 19 Ves. 394; Wilkes v. Wilkes,
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2 Dick. 791; Nicholls v. .Danvers, 2 Vern. 671; Williams v.
Callow, Id. 752; 2 Bright. H. & W. 354; Shelford Mar. & Div.
598 ; Reeves Dom. R. 209; 2 Story Eq., sect. 1422 et seq.
The ecclesiastical courts assumed jurisdiction to decree alimony
only when they decreed a separation, because 1st, from the earliest
period alimony was administered as an incident to a separation,
and not as an original right. 2d. It had no existence at common
law or in chancery as a separate and independent right, but was
recognised as an incident to a proceeding for some other purpose,
such as a supplicavit or divorce, hence the ecclesiastical courts did
not assume original jurisdiction of alimony alone, but only as an
incident to its divorce jurisdiction. This was in harmony with the
origin and history of divorce and alimony, with the chancery
court's jurisdiction and with the recognition at common law. It
follows that prior to the year 1858 no court in England had any
power to grant alimony when that was the only relief sought. It
could only be done as an incident to something else: Head v. H1ead,
3 Atk. 547; Ball v. Mfontgomery], 2 Yes. 191. In Ball v. M'ont-
gomery the court said that "no court, not even the ecclesiastical
court, has any original jurisdiction to give a wife a separate main-
tenance. It is always as incidental to some other matter that she
becomes entitled to a separate provision. If she applies in equity
upon a supplicavit for security of the peace against her husband,
and it is necessary that she should live apart, as incidental to
that the chancellor will allow her separate maintenance. So in
the ecclesiastical court if it (alimony) is necessary upon a divorce
d mensd et thoro propter savitiam." Although the writ of sup-
plicavit has been seldom used (2 Story's Equity Jurisprud., sects.
1422, 1423, 1476; 2 Roper Husband and Wife 309, 317, 320;
Clancy M. W. 453; Codd v. Codd, 2 Johns. Ch. 141), it shows
how alimony is incidental to a divorce, and in a late 6ase (Adams
v. Adams, 100 Mass. 365,) the court said that alimony alone was
never granted by this process. Its purpose and object was to
protect the wife from violence and abuse, and to accomplish this
it was necessary sometimes to direct a separation for the time
being, and separate maintenance for the wife whilst the separation
continued.
This doctrine in England was admitted for the reason that
granting alimony or separate maintenance, without the primary
and concurrent decree of divorce, was compelling the husband to
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support his wife in a manner contrary to law. The husband is not
compelled, under the law, to support his wife but in cohabitation,
unless he consents that she shall live separate, or commits some mat-
rimonial offence entitling her to refuse cohabitation. If he has done
either of these she can pledge his credit for her temporary sepa-
rate maintenance. If something more is wanted, she can obtain a
pernfanent provision concurrent with a separation. To decree
a separate provision or alimony without a separation is against
public policy.
An adjudication allowing the wife to live separate from the hus-
band, is a necessary foundation for an adjudication compelling
him to support her in a separate state. Cohabitation is the state
and condition which the law imposes, and for which marriage
was instituted. This state or condition must exist until the law
allows a separation, hence the court must first adjudge a separation
before it cin adjudge a support during that separation. The first
question is, shall cohabitation cease to exist (temporarily or per-
manently), and when this is determined the question of support or
alimony arises. This is the first question whether the application
be for alimony alone, or divorce and alimony, and it follows that if
the court has no jurisdiction over the one question it can have none
over the other; the one is concurrent and commensurate with the
other, and neither exists without the other.
Notwithstanding the foregoing proposition and the reasons for
it, there are cases holding the reverse of what has been stated.
In Oxenden v. Oxenden, 2 Vern. 498, the chancery court, on
an independent application, granted a separate maintenance, and
also in Nicholls v. Danvers, 2 Vern, 671, decreed to the wife for
her separate maintenance funds in the husband's possession whicli
came to her from her deceased mother's estate. In Williams v.
Callow, 2 Vern. 752, the chancery court, upon an application for a
separate maintenance alone, decreed the interest of a trust bond
given for the wife's portion. In these cases there was neither a
divorce nor an agreement to live separate.
The same rule was held in -Lasbrooc v. Tyler, 1 Cha. R. 44,
and Watkyns v. Watkyns, 2 Atk. 96; Duncan v. Duncan, 19 Yes.
394; 1 Fonb. Eq. 94, 104.
On the other hand Lord LouGHBOROUGH, in Ball v. Montgomery,
2 Yes. 195, said that he did not recollect any such cases as were
cited from Vernon, and asserted the broad doctrine that a mar-
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ried woman should not be a plaintiff in a suit in equihy for a
separate maintenance, and no court had original jurisdiction to
award it. This ruling was followed in Stones v. Cooke, 7 Sim.
22; .Vandergucht v. DeBlaquisere, 8 Id. 315.
Story's Equity Jurisprudence seems to have asserted both sides
of the question. in one section (1422), it is asserted that, although
it is the duty of the husband to provide a suitable maintenance for
his wife, it is not a duty, to decree separate maintenance only, of
which equity will assume jurisdiction: citing Ball v. Mlontgomery,
2 Yes. 195; Hfead v. Head, 3 Atk. 550; qegard v. Johnson, 3
Yes. 359; Clancy 549; .Foden v. Finney, 4 Russ. 428; Galland
v. Galland, 38 Cal. 265. If the husband does not provide suitable
maintenance, the proper remedy is by an action against the hus-
band by any person who has supplied her with necessaries : citing
Guy v. Pearkes, 18 Ves. 196; Harris v. Norris, 4 Esp. 41;
Hrodgres v. Hfodges, 1 Id. 441; Bolton v. Prentice, 2 Stra. 1214;
.Hindley v. The Marquis, 6 B. & C. 200; aames v. Sweetser,
101 Mass. 78; and if this reliance for support should be preca-
rious, the wife may make an application to the ecclesiastical court
for a decree: d mensd et thoro, or for a restitution of conjugal rights
upon which a suitable separate maintenance may be allowed:
citing Ball v. Jffontgomery, supra; Clancy on H. & W. 549;
1 Fonbl. Eq., ch. 2. But in America equity will, in such cases,
decree a wife a separate maintenance, upon the ground that there
is no adequate or sufficient remedy at law: citing Pufcell v.
Purcell, 4 Hen. & Munf. 507 ; Patterson v. Patterson, I Halst.
Ch. 389, which do not support the text. The remedy at law here
referred to means the action by a third person against the husband
for necessaries supplied to the wife ; yet in the succeeding section
it is asserted that equity has not general jurisdiction to decree sepa-
rate maintenance out of the husband's property, except on agree-
ment, &c., but may out of her own equitable estate.
This English doctrine of alimony or separate maintenance was
limited to supplicavit, agreement, and upon a divorce d mensd et
thoro. It was carried into the jurisprudence of some of the states,
and extended to awarding alimony upon an independent application,
and without being connected with a divorce, and ultimately to grant-
ing it after a divorce a vinculo in an independent proceeding, and
whether it had been previously asked or not. This jurisdiction in
some states was assumed and exercised on the ground that it
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belonged to the general jurisdiction of equity, although there
existed no ecclesiastical courts. It can thus easily be seen how
this jurisdiction originated and grew. Equity decreed the sepa-
rate maintenance as an incident to some other subject-matter of
which equity had original jurisdiction. The ecclesiastical courts
decreed it as incident to divorce, and neither, except during the
Cromwellian period, decreed it on an independent proceeding as a
substantive subject of jurisdiction.
In Alabama, California, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia,
and possibly Ohio, the jurisdiction of equity to decree alimony
alone has been more or less asserted and exercised. In all the other
states the jurisdiction is denied. In both cases the state statutes
may exercise an influence in determining the question.
In the year 1707 this question came under consideration in Mary-
land in Macamara's Case, 2 Bland. Ch. 566, and the court
allowed alimony without a divorce, asserting such jurisdiction as
general and original in the absence of ecclesiastical courts. This
was followed in Liynthecumb's Case in 1738, and Scott's Case in
1746, and Gavane's Case in 1750 (all reported in 2 Bland. 566),
and asserted in Golwith's Case, 4 Har. & MeH. 477, apparently
decided in 1689. This jurisdiction was confirmed by statute in
1777, which gave the court of chancery full power to hear and
determine all causes for alimony, but it was understood that the
jurisdiction did not extend to granting divorce. It was said in
Jamison v. Jamison, 4 Md. Ch. 289, that alimony was so granted
because "it is the duty of the husband to provide a suitable main-
tenance for his wife, and if he will not do so some proper remedy
should be provided to compel him. The action at law whereby the
person who supplies her with necessaries may sue the husband is a
precarious and uncertain yeliance for support. It is better that some
proceeding be instituted by which the husband will be compelled to
pay alimony or that the wife be restored to her conjugal rights, and
as we have no jurisdiction over applications of the latter kind, it is
best to grant alimony. ' This court had jurisdiction before the revo-
lution to grant alimony independent of the application for divorce."
This is the principle or doctrine adopted and followed in this state
(Helms v. Pranciscus, 2 Bland. Ch. 565; Wallingsford v. Wal-
lingsford, 6 H. & J. 485; Harding v. Harding, 22 Md. 337 ;
Keerl v. IKeerl, 34 Id. 21; J. C. v. H!. C., 33 Id. 401; Schindel
RIGHT TO ALILONY AFTER DIVORCE.
v. Schindel, 12 Id. 294 ; Du'nnocc v. Dunnock, 3 Id. Chan. 140),
and the courts have never gone to the extent of granting alimony
in a separate proceeding after a divorce a vinculo, except in Crane
v. Meginnis, 1 Gill & J. 463, which followed Richardson v.
Wilson, 8 Yerg. 67, holding that in a proper case there may
be a judicial decree for alimony after a legislative divorce, but
this seems to be against authority and the reason and policy of
the law.
In North Carolina in 1796 (Spiller v. Spiller, 1 Hayw. 482;
Knight v. Knight, 2 Id. 101), bills in equity by the wift against
the husband for alimony alone were sustained without question.
This jurisdiction has been sustained in later cases (Schonwald v.
Sechonwald, Phil. Eq. 215; Hodges v. Hodges, 82 N. 0. 122),
but such jurisdiction has not been stretched to grant alimony after
a divorce a vinculo.
This inherent jurisdiction of chancery to grant alimony has been
asserted and adopted in Virginia (Purcell v. Purcell, 4 Hen. &
Munf. 507; Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. 662), approving Duncan
v. Duncan, 19 Yes. 894, and rejecting Head v. Head, 3 Atk.
295, and Ball v. Montgomery, 2 Ves. Jr. 195. The cases in this
state follow the reasons for asserting the chancery jurisdiction
given in the Maryland cases, but did not grant it after divorce a
vinculo, and do not make distinction between alimony and a separate
maintenance.
In Alabama the court (Glover v. Glover, 16 Ala. 442; Wray v.
Wray, 33 Id. 187; Turner v. Turner, 44 Id. 437), at an early
period asserted and exercised original jurisdiction over the subject
of alimony, and in Glover v. Glover, after a careful review of the
English cases said, that the court was "free to adopt a rule of decision
for ourselves which we conceive to be more consonant with an
enlightened equity, and with the fundamental principles and
maxims upon which the jurisdiction of our courts of chancery is
based," and therefore the courts would in harmony with the courts
of Virginia, South Carolina and Kentucky, grant alimony in a
proper case on an independent application, because the husband is
bound to support his wife. "If law and conscience create this
obligation, and no court can enforce its performance or compensate
for its violation, then this class falsifies the maxim that for every
wrong there is a remedy, and for every injustice an adequate and
salutary relief." CHILTON, J., in Glover v. Glover.
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This applies to a separate maintenance, but in Turner v. Turner,
the court applied the doctrine after divorce a vinculo. In that
case husband and wife resided in Alabama. The husband
abandoned his wife, went to Indiana and procured an ex parte
decree of divorce. The wife sued in Alabama for divorce and
alimony. The husband pleaded the Indiana divorce as a bar, and
the court held that it was not a bar. Said PETERS, J. : " The
Indiana divorce cannot affect the wife's rights, except her right in
the husband as husband. It unmarries him and sets him free from
his marital vows to her. He is no longer the complainant's hus-
band. But it does not settle her right to alimony. It does not
settle her right to dower in his lands, and her statutory right to
distribution of his property in this state in the event she should
survive him, nor any other interest of a pecuniary character she
may have against him." But this decision should be placed on
the principle that the decree of divorce was ex parte, not obtained
at the bona fide domicile or the place of the offence, the grounds
upon which jurisdiction is taken, and hence could not and did not
affect the wife. This will accord with Shannon v. Shannon, 4
Allen 134; Smith v. Smith, 13 Gray 209; Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio
St. 502; Leith v. Leith, 39 N. H. 20; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46
N. Y. 30; Prosser v. Warner, 47 Vt. 667.
In California the court in Galland v. Galland, 38 Cal. 265, di-
vided on the question, the majority sustaining the jurisdiction and
the minority rejecting it. The case was an application for alimony
alone, and the court held, as in Virginia, South Carolina and Ken-
tucky, that equity had jurisdiction to decree it, whether the atiplica-
tion is or is not coupled with a prayer for divorce, approving the
reasoning of MILLS, J., in Butlerv. Butler, 4 Litt. 202, and stating
that the husband is obliged to support his wife ; that as there is no
remedy at common law for the husband's violation of this obligation,
equity must afford one in this as in all cases where conscience and
law acknowledge a right and no remedy. Besides, as equity enforced
agreements for separation and separate maintenance, it can do it
when he turns her out of doors; and that there is no difference in
decreeing alimony under an agreement to separate, and decreeing
it when the husband forces his wife to separate : citing Lasbrook
v. Tyler, 1 Ch. R. 24; Williams v. Callow, 2 Vern. 752; Wat
kyns v. Watkyns, 2 Atk. 97; Purcell v. Purcell, 4 H. & M. 507;
Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. 662; Logan v. Logan, 2 B. Mon.
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142; Prather v. Prather, 4 Dessaus. 33; B3hame v. Rhafrne, 1
McCord Ch. 197; Glover v. Glover, 16 Ala. 446. The dissenting
opinion held that equity had no such jurisdiction, because the
statute only allows alimony upon and in connection with divorce,
hence alimony is dependent upon and incidental or auxiliary to
an action pending for divorce, and there is no independent juris-
diction to grant it alone, and, because, on reason and authority
English and American courts of equity have no original jurisdic-
tion of this subject, and can only grant alimony as derivative from
and incidental to some other original subject of jurisdiction : cit-
ing Clancy 549; 2 Bishop, sect. 351; 2 Story Eq., sect. 1422;
Chapman v. Chapman, 13 Ind. 397; Shannon v. Shannon, 2
Gray 285; Sheafe v. Sheafe, 4 Fost. 567; Parsons v. Parsons,
9 N. H. 309; -Doyle v. Doyle, 26 Mo. 549. But this court has
not gone so far as to decree alimony after a divorce.
It should be kept in view that from the ruling of granting ali-
mony as a separate maintenance, developed the doctrine of granting
it as an independent proceeding after divorce, hence, if the pre-
mises in the former are not correct the latter doctrine is not correct.
In no state is this view presented better than in Kentucky. The
courts in this state assumed original equity jurisdiction, (Lockridge
v. Loccridgqe, 3 Dana 28; Boggess v. Boggess, 4 Id. 307; Wool-
dridge v. Lucas, 7 B. Mon. 49; Butler v. Butler, 4 Littell 205;
Rogers v. Rogers, 15 B. Mon. 364; -Hulett v. Hulett, 80 Ky.
356), and for a long time confined the doctrine to separate
maintenance--that is, to granting alimony as a separate mainte-
nance--leaving the marriage still existing, and afterwards ex-
tended it to alimony after a divorce. In Butler v. Butler, the
court held that equity had jurisdiction, regardless of the statute, to
decree alimony, leaving the matrimonial chain untouched, because
the husband is bound to support his wife. If he fail, it is a wrong
acknowledged at law, but for which, the law provides no remedy, and
therefore equity must furnish the remedy where law and conscience
acknowledge the right but give no remedy for its violation. The
contrary doctrine "arose in England for fear of intruding upon
the ground occupied by the ecclesiastical courts. These courts
were incorporated with and composed a part of their government,
and their sentence was as obligatory and as much noticed in their
civil courts as the decisions of other courts, and it became necessary
to restrain other courts from occupying the same ground. But in this
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country there are no such courts or boundaries. The reasons for re-
fusing jurisdiction here have ceased and do not exist." If our chan-
cery courts would not assume such jurisdiction "grievous wrongs
might exist without remedies until the legislature interfered,
which is against a well-known principle ripened into a maxim."
The court in this case reviewed the English cases and deemed them
conflicting. But in none of these cases can it be found that the
reason for the doctrine was that equity refused jurisdiction because
the ecclesiastical courts possessed it. On the contrary, it is dis-
tinctly asserted that the reason was that no court had original
jurisdiction of this matter alone, but bad it as incidental to
other subjects of jurisdiction. Subsequently this court, in Rogers
v. Rogers, applied this rule to alimony after divorce. In that case
husband and wife were domiciled in Kentucky, and the husband
sued in this domicile for divorce on the ground of abandonment and
obtained it. The wife appeared and defended, but did not ask and
was not given alimony. Some years thereafter both became resi-
dents of Ohio, and the wife commenced in the Ohio court a suit
for divorce and alimony, alleging fraud in the Kentucky pro-
ceedings, to which the husband pleaded the Kentucky divorce as a
bar. The Ohio Common Pleas Court held the divorce in Ken-
tucky valid, but as that court made no support or provision for the
wife, and the propriety of doing so was not adjudicated, a decree
for alimony was granted. Suit was brought in Kentucky on this
judgment for alimony, to which was pleaded the Kentucky
divorce, and also that the Ohio court bad no jursidiction to decree
alimony, and hence the judgment upon which the suit was brought
is null and void. Upon this question the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that the Ohio decree for alimony was valid, because it was
not shown that it was void for want of jurisdiction over the subject-
matter or the person, or void because it was fraudulently procured,
or that the same matter had been previously litigated between the
same parties in a court of this state. In explanation of this the
court said, "If the Kentucky decree bf divorce had the effect of
absolving thq husband and his estate from all liability no alimony
can in this case be allowed. But the right to alimony did not
depend upon the granting of the divorce; it depended on various
other matters, such as the nature of the cause for divorce,. the
husband's estate, &c. None of these were presented or considered
in that proceeding. After that divorce was granted the wife could
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have presented her claim for alimony, which the court would still
have the power to decide, notwithstanding a divorce had been granted.
It was the decree for divorce which created a cause for the alimony.
That the wife failed to present her claim for alimony in the Ken-
tucky divorce proceeding made no difference. That matter was
not rendered res adjudicata by the failure, and consequently the
Ohio court did not undertake to re-try any question involved in
the Kentucky proceeding." "If it be conceded that by the wife's
failure to claim and obtain a decree for alimony in the divorce
proceeding she is precluded from asserting it in another'action,
this would not make the Ohio decree for alimony invalid. It
could only be erroneous, and until reversed, it would have the
same effect as any other decree." The grounds upon which this
decision is based, and the reasons for it, are not satisfactory, and
seem to be in contravention of the current of authority and prin-
ciple.
The courts of Mississippi have taken both sides of this question.
In Shotwell v. Shotwell, 1 Smedes & Marshall, ch. 51, decided in
1843, the Circuit Court, on the wife's application, decreed a
divorce. Alimony was not asked, because of the statute limiting
jurisdiction of Circuit Courts to $500. Subsequently the wife sued
in the Superior Court of Chancery for alimony alone, alleging the
previous proceedings in and the decree of the Circuit Court. The
husband demurred on the ground, that upon principle and under
the statute, alimony is incident to and dependent upon the decree
of divorce, and as no decree for alimony was made in that pro-
ceeding a separate bill therefor cannot he maintained. The statute
provided that, when divorce is granted the court may grant such
alimony as is just and proper. The court overruled the demurrer,
stating that whilst it is usual to make the decree for alimony concur-
rent with the divorce or in the same proceeding, yet the omission
cannot affect the wife's right to seek alimony at a subsequent time,
by a separate and distinct proceeding and in another court of com-
petent jurisdiction; that alimony is a separate -and distinct right
resulting from a decree of divorce, but not identical with it, nor ne-
cessarily constituting one proceeding. "I am of opinion (said the
court) that a separate suit may be maintained for alimony after a de-
cree for a divorce in which such claim was omitted, if there was no
express act of the wife waiving her right thereto. If, therefore, a
separate bill can be maintained, I can see no reason why it may
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not be brought in any court having jurisdiction without regard to
the court which granted the divorce, there is nothing in the nature
of the proceedings which would limit it to the latter court; be-
cause "the wife's right to alimony proceeds upon the moral and
legal obligation of the husband 'to furnish her with a competent
support, and does not depend upon the point of time at which she
attempts to assert it. 'The right is founded in the very nature and
legal incidents of the marriage contract, hence it is if the husband,
by cruelty or misconduct, compels the wife to force herself from
hi m, the courts will enforce this obligation by compelling him to
set apart a portion of his estate for her support."
This decision was reversed by the Court of Errors and
Appeals (Lawson v. Siotwell. 27 Miss. 630 (1854) ), the
court stating that, "the authorities, almost without excep-
tion, agree that alimony is allowed only as an incident to some
other proceedings which may be legally instituted by the wife
against the husband, such, for instance, as an action for the
restitution of conjugal rights, divorce, &c." But, said the
court, "we do not intend to intimate that there may not be cases
in which an original bill, after a decree for a divorce, could not be
maintainedv for alimony, but only that the present bill shows no
suffi :ient reason for not taking or asking for alimony in the Circuit
Court. A good reason must be alleged why the alimony was not
at the proper time allowed. What will be a good reason must
depend upon the facts of the case when presented." This last
statement was made in consequence of misconstruing the jurisdic-
tion of the Circuit Court, intimating that if the plaintiff had not
purposely omitted the application for alimony in the divorce pro-
ceeding, another construction might be made. This was followed
by Bankston v. Bankston, 27 Miss. 692, affirming the doctrine
that chancery had no original jurisdiction, holding that the court
decreeing the divorce had the only power, and as it did not decree
final alimony a separate suit for alimony was not maintainable.
And this appears to be consistent with the Mississippi statute
(Code sect. 1159), providing that when the divorce is decreed, the'
court shall then make the orders conceriiing alimony.
The Pennsylvania courts (MeKarracher v. Mkearracher, 3
Yeates 56), held the reverse of Lawson v. Shotwell, holding that
the failure of the wife to claim alimony in the proceedings for
divorce was no bar to a further application for that purpose.
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In South Oarolina (Jelineau v. Jelineau, 2 Dessaussure 45;
Prather v. Prather, 4 Id. 33; Threewits v. Threewits, Id. 560 ;
Prince v. Prince, 1 Rich. Eq. 282) the courts exercise the jurisdic-
tion to grant a separate maintenance but term it alimony. The deci-
sions have not gone so far as to decree alimony after a divorce a vin-
culo, probably because divorces of this character are unknown there,
yet the decisions granting separate maintenance intimate that the
same rule would be applicable in all cases. In Tennessee alimony was
granted after a legislative divorce: Bichardson v. Wilson, 8 Yerg.
67. In that case the legislature granted the divorce a vincuto, but
reserved to the wife all right to alimony if, by law, she should be
entitled. The wife filed her petition for alimony, and the court
granted it, stating that it had power to take up the question where
the legislature left it; that alimony would have been granted if
the bill had not contained this reservation ; and that the right
of the wife to a support from her husband was a constitutional
right which the legislature could not take away by a divorce bill,
passed ex parte and without notice to her. This case decided the
point that alimony would be allowed after a legislative divorce
with a reservation as to alimony. The balance was dictum. This
case can be supported on two grounds: 1st, that the reservation in
the act is the same as a reservation in a decree of divorce, and the
granting of the alimony, in such case is allowing it in the same
proceeding; 2d, that the husband's ex parte divorce cannot destroy
the wife's right to alimony, because it would be perpetrating a
fraud, and because such decrees are not jurisdictional under the
laws giving credit to foreign decrees: Presser v. Warner, 47 Vt.
667; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30; Shannon v. Shannon,
4 Allen 134; Smith v. Smith, 13 Gray 209; Leith v. Leith, 39
N. 1. 20.
In Ohio (Cooper v. Cooper, 7 Ohio, 2 pt. 594; Mansfield v.
McIntyre, 10 Ohio 30; Oox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502; 20 Id. 439,)
the question has not been settled. In the latest case, Cox v. Cox,
the husband and wife were domiciled in Ohio. The husband
deserted his wife, went to Indiana and obtained a divorce. Some
time after the desertion the wife applied in the place of her domi-
cile, Ohio, for divorce and alimony. The husband pleaded the
Indiana divorce as a bar. On appeal the court held that the
domicile of the wife remained unaffected by the desertion of
the husband, and that the Indiana decree of divorce was no de-
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fence to her petition for alimony. The court followed Richardson
v. Wilson, Crane v. Meginnis and Shotwell v. Shotwell; but as
heretofore discussed none of these support it. This case.held that
jurisdiction of divorce is based on the domicile of the applicant, not
on the place of the marriage, nor the place of the offence, nor the
domicile of the defendant, because marriage is a social status, and
the state in which the applicant resides has the jurisdiction to
terminate this status ex parte, but nothing else, which decree pub-
lic policy requires to be elsewhere recognised, hence such decree is
not a bar to a proceeding for alimony in a court of another juris-
diction. This case is in harmony with the doctrine herein discussed
applicable to the effect of ex parte divorce in a foreign jurisdiction,
but is not, perhaps, authority on the question whether alimony is
incidental to divorce.
We come now to the decisions holding the other side of this ques-
tion. In England, since the Divorce Act, 20 & 21 Vict., sect. 32,
the courts have held in conformity with the history of the subject,
and on the principle involved, that. permanent alimony is the
creature of the Divorce Act, and cannot be allowed but in the
same proceedings granting the divorce: Winscome v. Winscome,
3 Swabey & Tristam R. 380.
In Arkansas the courts hold that alimony-is incident to a divorce,
and cannot be granted in an independent proceeding unless the stat-
ute expressly so provides. In Bowman v. Worthington, 24 Ark.
529, the facts were: The marriage took place in Kentucky. Hus-
band and wife then moved to Arkansas. Wife left her husband on
account of alleged adultery, went to Kentucky, obtained a legis-
lative divorce ex parte, and then commenced suit in the Arkansas
court for alimony. The demurrer to this application was sustained.
The court said that alimony is an incident of the divorce, grantable
in connection with it, and there is no jurisdiction to entertain a
separate application therefor. In this case the court reviews many
of the authorities, and holds that this is the only correct position to
be taken, and that Shotwell v. Shotwell, in Mississippi, was over-
ruled, and Richardson v. Wilson is contrary to the weight of
authority. The statute (ch. 59) in this state is substantially like
the statutes in most of the states, and provides that, "when
a decree of divorce shall be entered" the court shall provide for
the alimony.
The Georgia courts adopted the same principle, and in explana-
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tion of it, after reviewing the cases said, in McGee v. McGee, 10
Ga. 477, followed in Goss v. Goss, 29 Ga. 109, that no court. has
original jurisdiction to grant separate maintenance (alimony) whilst
the marriage exists. It is incidental to some other power having
jurisdiction to decree specific performance. Chancery can decree
a separate maintenance on an agreement for that purpose, and can
do it in other matters of which it has jurisdiction, such as supplicavit
for surety of the peace. But equity has no power to decree ali-
mony alone, on the ground of desertion, cruel treatment, failure to
maintain the wife, &c. Alimony is incident to divorce,- to be
obtained in the same proceeding, and not after the divorce in an
independent proceeding.
In Fiochli v. Fischli, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 360, the wife obtained a
decree of divorce a vinculo, and allowance of alimony in Kentucky.
Subsequently she commenced proceedings in Indiana for additional
alimony, alleging the inadequacy of the amount granted in Ken-
tacky. The court said that alimony "is incidental to divorce, the
court that decrees the divorce is to make the provision, and if that
court fails to provide for the wife by a division of the property or
makes an inadequate division, we know of no authority, either from
the act of the assembly (of Indiana) or the English books, for any
other court to remedy the evil or extend the provision," because
there is no precedent except a few extreme cases, the weight of
authority being the other way, the Kentucky court could have
decreed the necessary maintenance, and because alimony is an
incident of a divorce; hence, "when a matter is adjudicated by a
court of competent jurisdiction it is forever at rest, not only what
was actually determined, but every other matter which the parties
might have litigated in the cause." Hence, in divorce proceedings
the matter to be litigated is "the separate maintenance (alimony),
the wife's condition in life, the fortune she brought in marriage,
and her husband's circumstances." These were the subjects
of the litigation in Kentucky, and as that court had ample power
to do justice between the parties but failed to do it, no other
court can supply the deficiency. This was a case of inadequate
alimony.
In JTfuclenburg v. JHoller, 29 Ind. 139, the court stated that
" alimony is an incident of a suit for divorce, and is not a matter
which can constitute the subject of an independent suit. It must
be adjudged in the divorce proceeding or not at all. All questions
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of property are litigated in a suit for divorce, and must there be
settled. The complaint here shows that the parties have been
divorced, and the legal inference is that the subject-matter of the
suit was there settled and put at rest." This is the doctrine in
this state: Moon v. Baum, 58 Ind. 194; Middleworth v. McDow-
ell, 49 Id. 386. In Middleworth v. McDowell the wife obtained
divorce and alimony in Iowa. Constructive service on the hus-
band, who did not appear and who was not a resident of Iowa.
Subsequently she commenced suit in Indiana for the alimony so
decreed in Iowa. The court held the decree for .alimony of no
force in Indiana, because a personal judgment for money cannot
be made against a non-resident founded on publication. Following
Beard v. Beard, 21 Ind. 321 ; Liytle v. LXytle, 48 Id. 200 ; .D'Arcy
v. Ketchum, 11 How. (U. S.) 165; Board of Pub. Works v. Co-
lumbia College, 17 Wall. 521.
This doctrine is followed in Illinois: Chestnut v. Chestnut, 77
Ill. 346. In Iowa the courts are on both sides of this question.
In Blythe v. Blythe, 25 Iowa 266, the wife obtained a divorce,
but did not ask and did not receive alimony in the divorce pro-
ceeding. To an application for alimony alone, the court said that
no alimony can be allowed. "The relation of husband and wife
must exist either de jure or defacto in order to justify an order for
alimony." In iarshberger v. Harshberger, 26 Iowa 503; (Cole
v. Cole, 23 Id. 433; MeEwen v. Me-Ewen, 26 Id. 375), the court
said, "no independent action for alimony can be brought, it must
be connected with and follow a divorce." But in Graves v.
Graves, 36 Iowa 310 (14 Am. R. 525), a different view was
taken, holding that a court of equity has jurisdiction to entertain a
suit for and to grant alimony where no divorce or other relief is
sought, because the husband is bound to support his wife, hence, if
he makes it unsafe or immoral for his wife to remain with him, or
he forces her to leave, she carries his credit for support, and those
who furnish necessaries can sue at law; second, equity, can take
jurisdiction on the ground of avoiding multiplicity of suits, or on
the ground- that there is no adequate remedy at law ; third, on
well-settled equity principles as well as upon considerations of
public policy. Citing Jones v. Jones, 19 Iowa; O'Hagan v.
O'llagan, 4 Id. 509; McMullen v. McMullen, 10 Id. 412; Gal-
land v. Galland, 38 Cal. 265.
The doctrine heretofore stated that alimony is an incident of
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divorce and not the subject-matter of an independent proceeding, is
adopted in Maine (Jones v. Jones, 18 Me. 311; Renderson v.
Henderson, 64 Id. 419; Littlefield v. Paul, 69 Id. 533), and
in Massachusetts (Shannon v. Shannon, 2 Gray 287; Baldwin v.
Baldwin, 6 Id. 342; Coffin v. Dunham, 8 Cash. 405), and in
Michigan (Peltier v. Peltier, Har. Oh. 19; Perkins v. .Perkins,
16 Mich. 167; Wright v. Wright, 24 Id. 180.) In Peltier v.
Peltier the court said: "I am satisfied that exclusive of any
statutory provision, chancery has no jurisdiction to entertain an
application for alimony alone. The whole current of atithority
goes to show that courts of chancery have never entertained juris-
diction in cases of this kind, except in aid of some other court or to
carry into effect a marriage contract, or in execution of a trust."
Citing Head v. Head, 3 Atk. 551; Watkins v. Watkins, 2 Id.
98; Fonbl. Eq. 98; Codd v. Codd, 2 Johns. Oh. 141; Lewis v.
Lewis, 3 Id. 519; Mix v. Mix, 1 Id. 108; Bullock v. Menzies,
4 Yes. Jr. 799; Legard v. Johnson, 3 Id. 351. The same doc-
trine is followed in Missouri: Doyle v. Doyle, 26 Mo. 545, 549;
Simpson v. Simpson, 31 Id. 24. In Doyle v. Doyle the court
said: 1A court has no authority to grant alimony but as an inci-
dent to a divorce, except where it is conferred by statute. Our
statute allows alimony where the husband, without just cause,
abandons his wife. Without such a statute the courts cannot grant
alimony but as an incident to a divorce."
The same principle is adopted in New Hampshire (Parsons v.
Parsons, 9 N. H. 317; Sheafe v. Sheafe, 24 Id. 569), and in
New Jersey (Kerrigan v. Kerrigan, 2 McCart. 146; 'Nichols v.
Nichols, 10 C. E. Green 60; Yule v. Yule, 2 Stock. 138; Bock-
well v. Morgan, 2 Beas. 119; Anshutz v. Anshutz, 1 C. E.
Green 162; Cory v. Cory, 3 Stock. 400), and also in New York
(Atwater v. Atwater, 53 Barb. 621; Codd v. Codd, 2 Johns. Ch.
141; Lewis v. Lewis, 3 Id. 519; Mix v. Mix, 1 Id. 108; Perry
v. Perry, 2 Paige 501), and in Vermont (Hfarrington v. Hfarring-
ton, 10 Vt. 505; -Prosser v. Warner, 47 Id. 667). In Hoffman
v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30, the husband and wife were residents of
and domiciled in New York ; the husband left the domicile, went to
Indiana and obtained a divorce, the service being by publication.
The wife had no knowledge of and did not appear in the proceeding.
Subsequently the wife sued in New York (the place of the domicile
and place where the cause for divorce was committed) for divorce
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and alimony, to which was pleaded the Indiana divorce as a bar.
The court held that it was not a bar, because the Indiana court had
no jurisdiction, as the husband was a resident of New 'York, and
went only to Indiana to get the divorce, and because the wife was
not served with process or appeared. The judgment was obtained
by fraud and obtained ex parte. This case was really decided on
the doctrine of the'effect of an ex parte judgment.
In Prosser v. Warner, 47 Vt. 667, the husband and wife were
domiciled in Vermont. The husband abandoned the wife. She
thereupon returned to New York, the place of the marriage, and
obtained a divorce and alimony by ex parte proceedings, for adul-
tery of the husband in Vermont. Upon this jndgment for alimony
she commenced an action for debt in Vermont. The court held
that this New York decree was not binding in Vermont. The
decree was not obtained at the place of the domicile nor the place
of the offence. Although these, and some other cases heretofore
mentioned, were applications for alimony alone, the decisions were
based on the doctrine of the effect of an ex parte decree, and not
on the principle that alimony is an incident of a divorce, hence this
is a connecting question with the one under discussion.
This appears to be the state of, the decisions upon this question.
Alimony either is or is not incident to a divorce. If it is, it
must be obtained in the divorce proceeding, because the substantive.
carries with it all its incidents. If this is true, a decree for ali-
mony will be valid if the decree for divorce is valid; hence, if an
ex parte decree for divorce is valid, an ez parte decree for alimony
in the same proceeding should also be valid. On the other hand,
if alimony is not incident to divorce. it should be a substantive
matter of jurisdiction like any claim or demand for money. But
whilst the authorities hold that alimony is incident to divorce, they
also hold that an exparte decree for alimony is not valid. Either
one or the other of these positions is incorrect, or there must be a
principle upon which both can be reconciled. Perhaps this appar-
ent conflict can be reconciled if it can be established that marriage
is a status, and that an ex parte divorce only acts upon and dis-
solves this status. If so, it is a separate and distinct subject-matter
from the matter. of alimony. Here another question enters,
namely, will the dissolution of this status in one state have the
effect of dissolving it in another state, and can such a divorce carry
alimony with it. If it is a status it must be a something-a substan-
